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THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
CASENO.20030509-CA 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction over this appeal from the final decision of the 
district court under transfer from the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2002). 
ISSUE PRESENTED UPON APPEAL 
The State agrees that the only issue on appeal is whether the district court correctly 
dismissed plaintiffs Complaint for failing to comply with the notice of claim provision of 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the "Immunity Act", Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-
11(2000 & Supp. 2003)), by failing to identify the location of the accident that gave rise 
to her claim. 
Standard of Review: "We review the dismissal of a case under the [Immunity] Act 
for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's determination of law." Gurule v. 
Salt Lake County, 2003 UT 25, ^ 3, 69 P.3d 1287. 
Issue Preserved Below: The State raised this issue below in its motion to dismiss 
(the "Motion"), supporting memorandum, and reply memorandum. R. 16-18, 19-32, 61-
68. The district court granted the State's Motion on this point. R. 77-82. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (2000 & Supp. 2003), in pertinent part, provides as 
follows: 
63-30-11. Claim for injury - Notice - Contents - Service - Legal disability -
Appointment of guardian ad litem. 
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if the claim were 
against a private person begins to run. 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or against its 
employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance of the employee's 
duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority shall file a written 
notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not 
the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known. 
(b) The notice of claim shall be: 
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's agent, 
attorney, parent, or legal guardian; and 
(ii) directed and delivered to: 
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is against the State of Utah. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (2000 & Supp. 2003) (subsection (4) omitted). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
On January 8, 2003, plaintiff filed a Complaint in this action arising out of a 
December 5, 2001 slip and fall accident that occurred outside a state-operated liquor 
store. R. 1-5. The Complaint set forth a claim of negligence against both Magna 
Investment & Development ("Magna Investment"), the owner of the property, and the 
State of Utah, the lessee of the space. R. 3-4. As the case involved claims against the 
State of Utah, on or about September 18, 2002, plaintiff filed a notice of claim (the 
"Notice"), pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11, relating to this accident. R. 28-30. A 
copy of the Notice is attached as Addendum A. 
The State moved to dismiss the Complaint under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the 
ground that plaintiffs Notice did not comply with section 63-30-11 because it failed to 
identify the location of the accident. R. 16-18, 19-27. Plaintiff filed a responsive 
memorandum opposing the Motion. R. 40-60. The State then filed a reply memorandum 
(R. 61-68) and submitted the Motion for decision. R. 69-70. 
A hearing on the Motion was held on May 12, 2003. R. 76, 114. At the hearing, 
the trial court issued an oral ruling in which it granted the State's Motion. R. 114 at 22-
27. On May 27, 2003, the trial court entered an Order granting the State's Motion and 
dismissing the claims against the State. R. 77-82. A copy of that Order is attached as 
Addendum B. In its ruling, the trial court held that in order to effectuate the purposes of 
the Immunity Act, in a case of this type, a notice of claim must identify the location of 
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the accident. R. 80, % 4. The court further held that plaintiffs failure to do so rendered 
her Notice noncompliant with section 63-30-11, and dismissed the State of Utah from the 
case. Zrf.,1| 5. 
Although the case has proceeded in the district court against Magna Investment, 
all of plaintiff s claims against the State have been resolved. Because the issue of 
governmental immunity is unique to the State defendant, there was no just reason to 
delay the conclusion of this matter as to the State, and so the trial court entered Final 
Judgment for the State pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). R. 81, U 3, 83-85. Plaintiff 
filed a timely Notice of Appeal on June 13, 2003. R. 91-92. 
B. Statement of Relevant Facts 
On December 5, 2001, plaintiff Delone Peeples slipped and fell on the sidewalk in 
front of a liquor store operated by the State of Utah. R. 3,1ft| 8-9. The accident occurred 
at the Cottonwood liquor store, located at 1863 East 7000 South, Salt Lake City. R. 32. 
That store occupies a space in a strip mall that is owned by the co-defendant in this 
matter, Magna Investment. R. 3, % 13. 
On September 18, 2002, plaintiff filed a Notice of Claim, relating to this slip and 
fall accident. R. 28-30. That Notice briefly described the accident as follows: 
On December 5, 2001, Ms. Peeples fell in front of a Utah State Liquor Store on 
ice, which was allowed to accumulate on the sidewalk, from a poorly designed 
rain gutter that drains onto the top of the sidewalk, rather than underneath it. 
R. 28, Addendum A (emphasis added.) The Notice did not provide the location of the 
accident and did not identify the liquor store at which this accident occurred. Id. There 
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are 35 state liquor stores in the State of Utah, 17 of which are in the Salt Lake area. R. 
31-32. 
On or about January 8, 2003, plaintiff filed her Complaint in this matter alleging 
that she slipped and fell in front of a liquor store because the walkway was icy due to the 
improper design of a rain gutter that emptied onto the sidewalk. R. 1-5. Plaintiff asserts 
that both Magna Investment and the State were negligent in failing to maintain the 
property by allowing ice to accumulate. R. 3-4. The Complaint incorrectly stated that 
this accident occurred "at 7200 South State Street, Salt Lake City, State of Utah." R. 3, % 
12. There is no state liquor store at that location. R. 31-32. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the plaintiff complied with the notice of claim 
provision of the Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(a)(i) (2000 & Supp. 
2003), when she failed to identify the location of her accident. Section 63-30-11 
requires a plaintiff to set forth "a brief statement of facts" in her notice. Because that 
phrase is not statutorily defined, courts look to the purpose behind filing notices of claim 
to determine what is required. Under Utah law, the purpose of a notice of claim is two-
fold: (i) to provide the State with an opportunity to correct the condition that caused the 
injury, and (ii) to evaluate and possibly settle the claim without litigation. Larson v. 
Park CityMun. Corp., 955 P.2d 343, 345-46 (Utah 1998). Here, where the plaintiff 
asserts a slip and fall due to an unsafe condition at a specific place, it is axiomatic that 
the State must know where the condition exists before it can either evaluate the claim or 
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correct the unsafe condition. Thus, the plaintiff must identify the location of the alleged 
dangerous condition causing the accident in her notice of claim. The trial court agreed 
and held that plaintiffs notice, which stated that she fell in front of an unidentified state 
liquor store, was insufficient. R. 79-80, ffi| 1-5. 
This Court should affirm the trial court's ruling. First of all, the courts of this 
State have consistently held that a plaintiff must strictly comply with the notice of claim 
provisions of the Immunity Act. Plaintiffs suggestion for a lesser standard is without 
support. (Although, plaintiffs omission of the accident's location renders her notice 
invalid under any standard.) Second, Utah appellate courts have consistently held that 
actual notice does not excuse a failure to comply with the notice of claim statute. 
Precedent thus requires that this Court reject plaintiffs request to consider extrinsic 
evidence offered to show that the State had actual notice of the location of the accident. 
Finally, there is no basis for construing the notice of claim statute liberally under Utah 
Code Ann, § 68-3-2, as plaintiff suggests. Plaintiff never raised that argument below, 
and, in any event, the specific language of the Immunity Act takes precedence over a 
general rule of construction such as § 68-3-2. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT BECAUSE 
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OMITTED A MATERIAL FACT, IT 
FRUSTRATED THE PURPOSES OF THE ACT AND WAS DEFICIENT. 
"Compliance with the Immunity Act is a prerequisite to vesting a district court 
with subject matter jurisdiction over claims against governmental entities." Wheeler v. 
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McPherson, 2002 UT 16, ^ 9,40 P.3d 632. This mandate includes complying with the 
notice of claim provision of the Immunity Act, section 63-30-11. Id., 1fl| 11-12. A notice 
of claim must set forth: "(i) a brief statement of the facts; (ii) the nature of the claim 
asserted; and (iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known." Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(a)(2000 & Supp. 2003). Utah law requires strict compliance 
with these notice of claim provisions. See, e.g., Wheeler, ^% 11-13 (where 
plaintiffs claims were dismissed because she delivered her notice to the county 
commissioners rather than the county clerk as required under the Immunity Act, even 
though an employee of the clerk's office signed for and acknowledged receipt of the 
notice, albeit on behalf of the commissioners. Id., \ 16.); Gurule, 2003 UT 25, ffl| 4-7 
(where plaintiffs claims were dismissed because plaintiff delivered the notice of claim 
to a county commissioner rather than the county clerk, even though the notice was then 
forwarded to the clerk. Id., U 6.) 
The phrase "a brief statement of the facts" is not statutorily defined. That is 
because section 63-30-11, by definition, applies to any claim asserted against the State 
and so it must be general enough to apply to all manner of claims - slip and fall claims 
such as this case, as well as cases that arise out of very different circumstances. Thus, 
section 63-30-1 l(3)(a) must be generally worded in order to fulfill the purposes of the 
Act in any case. 
Because that statutory phrase is undefined, the "preeminent" principle of statutory 
construction dictates an interpretation that is "compatible with its purpose and 
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objective." Wills v. Heber Valley Hist RR. Auth., 2003 UT 45, H 5, 79 P.3d 934. See 
also Larson, 955 P.2d 343 at 346 (stating that "a claimant has no other choice but to rely 
upon the statutes and upon the purpose of the notice statute in deciding how, and upon 
whom, such a notice of claim is to be filed.") The Utah Supreme Court has stated that a 
"notice of claim provides the entity being sued with the factual details of the incident 
that led to the plaintiffs claim. Moreover, it provides the governmental entity an 
opportunity to correct the condition that caused the injury, evaluate the claim, and 
perhaps settle the matter without the expense of litigation." Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 
1999 UT 36, H 20, 977 P.2d 1201 (emphasis added, citations omitted.) Utah Supreme 
Court precedent has consistently recognized these dual purpose for filing notices of 
claim - i.e., to remediate a problem and to investigate a claim in anticipation of 
litigation. Id. See also Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 2002 UT 17, f 10,42 
P.3d 379; Larson, 955 P.2d at 345-46. In fact, in Hall v. Utah State Dep 9t ofCorr., 2002 
UT 34, % 15,24 P.3d 958, the court dismissed plaintiffs claims when he filed his notice 
of claim contemporaneous with the filing of his lawsuit. The court held that was 
improper because it deprived the State of the opportunity to evaluate the claim and to 
decide whether to approve or deny it. 2001 UT 34, ^ | 26. 
In this case, plaintiff alleges an "unsafe" condition on a sidewalk in front of a 
state liquor store. R. 4, % 4. As the district court ruled, the State must know the location 
of that condition before it can either correct the alleged problem or evaluate the claim 
that allegedly arose because of it. R. 80, ffi| 3-4, 114 at 22-27. At a minimum, the 
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location of the accident, and of the unsafe condition, must be included in the notice of 
claim in order to effectuate the statute's purpose. It is hard to imagine a fact more 
important to an investigation of a slip and fall case. 
Plaintiffs failure to identify that location renders her Notice useless and non-
compliant under any standard; it fails to convey "a brief statement of the facts" as 
required under section 63-30-11, and does not include the "factual details" necessary to 
carry out the section's purposes. Rushton, % 20. That omission is magnified by the fact 
that there are currently 35 state liquor stores in the State of Utah, 17 of which are in the 
Salt Lake area. R. 31-32. Plaintiffs Notice fails to provide any information to help the 
State narrow that list. For these reasons, the lower court properly held that the plaintiffs 
failure to identify the location at which she fell frustrated the purpose behind the notice 
provisions of the Immunity Act and was therefore non-compliant. R. 80, HU 3-5. 
Despite the law recognizing the dual purposes for filing notices of claim, plaintiff 
seems to argue that there is only one purpose for a notice of claim - to investigate and 
possibly settle a legal claim. In doing so, plaintiff implies that the location of the 
accident is unimportant when it comes to evaluating plaintiffs claim. Plaintiffs 
argument is illogical. Knowing the location of a slip and fall accident is necessary to 
conducting an investigation of a claim of this type. In evaluating a claim, a prudent 
evaluator needs to observe the accident site in order to assess all of the circumstances 
bearing on the State's alleged liability. Thus, even if, as plaintiff suggests, the only 
purpose behind a notice of claim were to allow the State to conduct pre-litigation 
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investigation, her notice failed to convey the minimal information necessary for the 
State to effectuate that purpose. 
Plaintiff cites two cases, Wills and Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth., 618 P.2d 480 
(Utah 1980), where the court only addressed the investigative purpose. In those cases, 
however, the central issue was whether the notice was properly served upon the correct 
person, and so the there was no reason to discuss the remedial purposes of the notice 
provisions of the Immunity Act. Neither Wills nor Stahl supports a retraction of the 
remedial purpose for filing notices of claim. 
The omission of the location of the accident renders the plaintiffs Notice 
insufficient and frustrates the State's ability to either investigate the claim or correct the 
alleged dangerous condition. The plaintiffs Notice is deficient for both reasons. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED A STRICT 
COMPLIANCE STANDARD TO PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF CLAIM. 
The Utah Supreme Court has "consistently and uniformly held that suit may not 
be brought against the state or its subdivisions unless the requirements of the 
Governmental Immunity Act are strictly followed." Wheeler, 2002 UT 16, U 11 
(emphasis added.) See also Gurule, 2003 UT 25,1 5; Pigs Gun Club, 2002 UT 17, 
% 10. Having correctly found plaintiffs notice materially deficient, the district court had 
no choice but to dismiss the case in accordance with the strict compliance standard. 
Disregarding these precedents, plaintiff spends much of her brief asking this 
Court to ignore well-settled law and apply a looser standard. Plaintiffs failure to include 
10 
a material fact such as the location of the accident, however, would render her notice 
non-compliant under any standard. Nonetheless, the State takes this opportunity to 
refute plaintiffs contention that a looser standard should apply. 
A. The Contents of a Notice of Claim Must Strictly Comply With the 
Statute. 
In arguing for a less than strict standard, plaintiff ignores the two cases that, like 
this case, address the content of a notice of claim. These two cases (which were not 
addressed by plaintiff, even though the State relied on them below) demonstrate that the 
contents of a notice of claim, like the procedural aspects of filing a notice of claim, must 
strictly comply with section 63-30-11. 
In Yearsley v. Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990), plaintiff was allegedly beaten 
by police officers in the course of an arrest. Plaintiffs notice of claim "complained only 
of assault and battery. No mention [was] made in [the notice] of any unlawful arrest or 
malicious prosecution." Id. at 1129. Plaintiff then filed suit, asserting a claim for 
assault which was dismissed on summary judgment. He subsequently sought to amend 
his complaint to assert a claim for "malicious arrest and prosecution." Id. at 1128. The 
Supreme Court affirmed this Court and the trial court, holding that "unlawful arrest and 
malicious prosecution were clearly outside the scope of the nature of the claim" stated in 
the notice of claim. Id. at 1129. 
In Straley v. Halliday, 997 P.2d 338 (Utah App. 2000), plaintiffs claim was 
dismissed because even though the notice of claim asserted that Judge Halliday acted 
11 
"wrongfully and wilfully," it failed to use the exact words "fraud or malice." Id. at 342. 
The notice was thus insufficient to preserve a claim against Judge Halliday, a state 
employee, against whom fraud or malice must be shown for personal liability to attach 
under the Immunity Act. See also Rushton (where letters submitted by the plaintiff were 
insufficient to constitute a notice of claim because they failed to state the nature of the 
claims asserted. 1999 UT 36,121.) 
In each of these cases, plaintiffs claims were dismissed for failing to properly 
describe them in the notice of claim. They demonstrate that a plaintiff must strictly 
comply with all of the notice of claim requirements of the Immunity Act, including those 
relating to its content. Just as this Court rejected the notice in Straley because the 
plaintiff never uttered the magic words "fraud or malice," it should similarly reject the 
Notice in this case where the location of the accident was completely omitted. 
B. There is No Support for Anything Less than Strict Compliance. 
Despite plaintiffs acknowledgment that "there is no case holding" that less than 
strict compliance is adequate (App. Br. at 14), plaintiff nonetheless argues that the 
"Supreme Court may have allowed something less than strict compliance" in three cases. 
Id. Again, it does not matter which standard applies because plaintiffs omission of the 
location of the accident renders her Notice non-compliant under any standard. In any 
event, the Utah Supreme Court has not endorsed a less-than-strict standard. 
In Moreno v. Jordan SchoolDisL, 926 P.2d 886 (Utah 1996), the Court held that 
a child's guardian was authorized to assert claims for heirs under the wrongful death 
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statute, and so the notice filed by the guardian preserved claims for the heirs, which 
included the child's natural parents. The court expressly applied a strict compliance 
standard (id. at 891), and held that the notice was "legally sufficient" because the person 
who filed the notice (the guardian) was the party who was legally permitted to bring the 
claims on behalf of the heirs (the parents). Id. at 892. 
In Larson, plaintiff was required to give notice to the city's "governing body," 
which was not defined in the Act. 955 P.2d at 345. Another section of the Code defined 
governing body as the legislative and executive body of the city, while the rules of civil 
procedure stated that service of process was to be effected upon the city recorder. Id. 
Notably, in Larson, the court was dealing with a bona fide ambiguity because Utah's 
statutory law was directly at odds with the Rules of Procedure, unlike this case where 
there is no law inconsistent with requiring a party to identify the location of an accident 
in her notice of claim. In Larson, the court held that service upon the recorder, as the 
city's official designee for such purposes, was thus appropriate (under an older version 
of the Immunity Act.) Id. at 346. 
Plaintiff also relies on Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT 247, 53 P.3d 2. There, the 
plaintiff in a medical malpractice case filed a notice of claim upon her doctor, a 
University of Utah employee. The doctor was deemed immune and was dismissed from 
the case and so the issue was whether the plaintiff could assert a claim against the 
University when the notice had only been delivered to the doctor. This Court held that 
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because the University was legally required to answer for the wrongs of its employee, 
the notice was sufficient. 2002 UT 247, ffl| 25-27. 
Contrary to plaintiffs argument, in Nunez, this Court did not stray from a strict 
compliance standard. In fact, in Gurule, the Utah Supreme Court clarified this Court's 
decision in Nunez and expressly stated: 
The court of appeals held that the trial court erred because the notice of claim 
complied with the statutory requirements, which did not require the University of 
Utah or its medical school to be separately named. The Nunez case merely 
represents an application of the strict compliance standard and does not support 
the concept of reasonably strict compliance. Thus, we follow our long-held rule 
requiring strict compliance with the notice of claim provisions—a standard not met 
in this case. 
2003 UT 25, K 8 (emphasis added, citations omitted). 
None of these three cases supports a loosened standard, and the courts' ruling in 
each is consistent with the purpose behind filing notices of claim. The guardian in 
Moreno was statutorily entitled to act for the heirs, and so, from the defendant's 
perspective, the identity of the real party in interest made no difference in evaluating 
plaintiffs claim. Likewise, in Nunez, it made no difference whether the person receiving 
the notice was the doctor or the doctor's employer because, under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior, the employer would be the responsible party. Nunez, 2002 UT 247, 
T[ 26. The same holds true in Larson, where the recorder was specifically designated to 
act on behalf of the city. 
This case, however, is different because the failure to identify the location of an 
accident is antithetical to the ability to investigate the accident and, if possible, prevent 
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recurrence. In order to facilitate investigation and remediation, the plaintiffs notice 
must provide basic information such as the location of the accident. If plaintiff s notice 
in this case is permitted to stand, the investigative and corrective purposes behind section 
63-30-11 would be rendered meaningless. This Court should avoid such an 
interpretation. See, e.g., Hall, 2002 UT 34, K 15 (stating that courts should "avoid 
interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative.") 
Plaintiffs deficient notice in this case cannot be sustained. 
III. THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT ACTUAL NOTICE 
WAS IRRELEVANT. 
Plaintiff argues that she should be allowed to rely on "extrinsic evidence" outside 
the notice - i.e., correspondence between the State and the plaintiffs attorney - to 
demonstrate that the State was on actual notice of the location of the accident from other 
means. The trial court rejected that argument and held as follows: 
6. The Court further concludes that although the State may have had 
actual notice of the location of the Accident from other correspondence 
sent by plaintiffs counsel, the court will not consider such extrinsic 
evidence because actual notice "does not cure a party's failure" to comply 
with the notice of claim provisions of the Act. Pigs Gun Club v. Sanpete 
County, 42 P.3d 379, 382 (Utah 2002); Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 
P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999). 
R. 80,1 6. 
On appeal, plaintiff acknowledges that "no court in Utah has explicitly stated that 
extrinsic evidence shall be considered" (App. Br. at 20), yet ignores the long line of 
cases unambiguously holding that a governmental entity's actual knowledge of material 
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facts from other sources "does not cure a party's failure to meet [the notice of claim] 
requirements." Rushton, 1999 UT 36, H 19. See also Gurule, 2003 UT 25, U 5 (actual 
notice is "insufficient to give the courts jurisdiction when a claimant fails to strictly 
comply with the statute."); Pigs Gun Club, 2002 UT 17, Tf 10 ("[w]e have consistently 
held that [the purposes of filing notices of claim] are fulfilled only by the timely filing of 
a notice of claim-even when the entity charged had actual notice of the circumstances of 
the claim."); Wheeler, 2002 UT 16, U 16 ("as we have repeatedly stated, actual notice of 
a claim by a governmental entity does not absolve a party of its duty to strictly comply 
with the [Immunity] Act."); Greene v. Utah Transit Authority, 2001 UT 109,115, 37 
P.3d 1156 ("Actual notice of a claim by a governmental entity does not excuse a 
claimant's strict compliance with the requirements of the Immunity Act. As outlined 
above, the legislature has explicitly declared how, what, when, and to whom a party must 
direct and deliver a Notice in order to preserve his or her right to maintain an action 
against a governmental entity. Compliance with the statute is the determining issue, not 
actual notice." (Citations omitted.)) 
Despite this well-settled rule, plaintiff contends that the Court strayed from this 
principle by implicitly relying on extrinsic evidence in the Nunez case. That, however, is 
incorrect. In Nunez, the Court held that the notice itself sufficiently apprised not only 
Dr. Albo, but also the State, of the claims against it. Nunez, 2002 UT 247, U 26 ("Ms. 
Nunez's notice of claim alerted the State that she intended to assert a claim based on the 
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treatment she received from Dr. Albo.") There was no need to resort to extrinsic 
evidence, and it would have been improper to do so. 
The courts of this State have not wavered in rejecting an actual notice standard 
when addressing notices of claim under the Immunity Act. The plaintiff must comply 
with the notice of claim requirement within the four corners of her Notice; a 
governmental entity's actual notice is irrelevant.1 The lower court therefore properly 
refused to consider extrinsic evidence offered for this purpose. 
IV. THE RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DO NOT CHANGE 
THE STRICT COMPLIANCE STANDARD. 
As demonstrated above, there is no support for anything less than strict 
compliance under the Immunity Act. On appeal, plaintiff not only argues for less than 
strict compliance under the Immunity Act, but also urges this Court to adopt a liberal 
statutory construction of the Act, relying on Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 (2000). Section 
68-3-2, however, was never raised below, and Utah's appellate courts have repeatedly 
held that issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be addressed. Gilley v. 
Blackstock, 2002 UT App. 414, \ 11, n. 3, 61 P.3d 305; Ringwood v. Foreign Auto 
Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1358-59 (Utah App. 1990). 
1
 In fact, even a subsequently filed Complaint cannot cure a deficient notice of 
claim. See Straley, 997 P.2d at 342. Notably, here, plaintiffs Complaint incorrectly 
stated that the accident occurred at a state liquor store "at approximately 7200 South State 
Street." R. 3, ffl[ 8, 12. No store exists at that location. R. 31-32. 
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Even if this Court were to address section 68-3-2 on the merits, however, that 
statute of general construction cannot take precedence over the express mandate and 
language of the Immunity Act itself. As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Wheeler, the 
strict compliance standard "derives naturally from both basic principles of sovereign 
immunity and from the text of the Immunity Act itself. . . . . Where the 
government grants statutory rights of action against itself, any conditions placed on those 
rights must be followed precisely." Wheeler, 2002 UT 16, % 11 (citations omitted). 
Consequently, the courts of this state "repeatedly den[y] recourse to parties that have 
even slightly diverged from the exactness required by the Immunity Act." Id., % 12. 
Plaintiffs attempt to use section 68-3-2 to overrule the strict compliance 
principle is misplaced. A well-settled rule of statutory construction, provides that "when 
two statutory provisions conflict in their operation, the provision more specific in 
application governs over the more general provision." Hall, 2002 UT 34, H 15. Here, 
section 63-30-11 expressly addresses the content of a notice of claim, and specifically 
requires plaintiff to include "a brief statement of facts." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11. 
That specific statutory directive overcomes any law relating to general statutory 
construction, such as section 68-3-2. 
Moreover, all of the five cases plaintiff cites in support of her argument are 
inapposite because none of them address the Immunity Act. Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 
1357 (Utah App. 1993), involved the interpretation of a habeas corpus statute in a 
criminal matter. In Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983), the 
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Court addressed the wrongful death statute and held that punitive damages were 
recoverable thereunder. Ringwood v. State, 333 P.2d 943 (Utah 1959), addressed a 
statute pertaining to the revocation of drivers' licenses. In Remington Rand, Inc. v. 
O'Neil, 309 P.2d 368 (Utah 1957), the court focused on a garnishment statute. Finally, 
Houston Real Estate Inv. Co. v. Hechler, 138 P. 159 (Utah 1914), dealt with an 
intervention statute in the landlord/tenant setting. 
Section 63-30-11 clearly states that a plaintiff must file a notice of claim 
containing a statement of facts. In order to be meaningful, that statement must include 
material facts such as the location of a slip and fall accident. Plaintiff cannot avoid 
compliance with the specific requirements of section 63-30-11 by relying on a statute of 
general statutory construction, such as section 68-3-2. 
CONCLUSION 
Just as the appellate courts have struck down notices that fail to use specific 
words like "fraud and malice" (as in Straley), notices that do not properly describe 
plaintiffs claims (as in Yearsley and Rushton), notices that fail to identify a plaintiff (as 
in Pigs Gun Club), notices that are delivered to the wrong person, despite the fact that 
the correct person ultimately receives the notice (as in Gurule and Wheeler), and notices 
that do not give the State enough time to evaluate a claim (as in Hall), this Court should 
strike down the notice in this case, which completely omits the location where the claim 
arose. 
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If the notice of claim process is to be meaningful, the plaintiff must include the 
minimal information necessary for the State to be able to investigate a claim and remedy 
any unsafe condition. In this case, that minimal information must include the location of 
the accident. PlaintifPs failure to provide that vital information renders her Notice non-
compliant under section 63-30-11, thereby depriving the courts of jurisdiction over her 
claims against the State. 
For these reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
decision of the trial court. 
REQUEST RE ORAL ARGUMENT 
The State hereby requests oral argument on this appeal because the issue of what 
constitutes a "brief statement of the facts" under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 has never 
been addressed by an appellate court in this state. 
Dated this / day of February, 2004. 
BARRTf G. LAWRENCE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees 
20 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this "j day of February, 2004,1 caused to be mailed, 
first class postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLEES to the following: 
Brock Van de Kamp 
Siegfried & Jensen 
5664 South Green Street 
Murray, Utah 84123 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Terry Plant 
Plant, Wallace, Christensen & Kanell 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Magna Investment & Development 
ADDENDUM A 
Plaintiffs "Notice of Claim" dated September 18, 2002 
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UTAH STATE RISK MANAGEMENT 
Attn: Jim Sefandonakis 
5120 South Office Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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Utah Attorney General 
STATE OF UTAH 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Salt Lake County Recorder 
2001 South State Street, Suite N-1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1150 
Re: Our Client: 
Your Insured: 
Date of Loss: 
Delone Peeples 
Utah State Liquor Store 
December 5, 2001 
NOTICE OF CLAIM 
Delone Peeples, by and through her attorney of record, Dustin Lance of 
Siegfried & Jensen, does hereby give Notice of Claim against the State of Utah, 
pursuant to U .CA §63-30-11, for injuries she sustained and damages incurred. 
On December 5, 2001, Ms. Peeples fell in front of a Utah State Liquor 
Store on ice, which was allowed to accumulate on the sidewalk, from a poorly 
designed rain gutter that drains onto the top of the sidewalk, rather than 
underneath it. 
NOTICE OF CLAIM 
Re: Delone Peeples 
September 18, 2002 
Page Two 
Liability is clear in this case. The State of Utah was negligent, in among 
things, failing to take adequate measures of ice removal, especially considering 
the facts which would put them on notice of this dangerous condition. 
Due to the negligence of the State of Utah, Delone Peeples sustained 
serious injuries, including, but not limited to, multiple hip fractures, multiple 
contusions and abrasions to her left leg, left ankle, back, left shoulder and left 
arm pain. Ms. Peeples has undergone treatment for her injuries and will continue 
to undergo treatment and therefore has and will continue to incur medical 
expenses in connection with this incident. Delone Peeptes claims damages 
related to the injuries sustained in the incident, including damages for any 
permanent impairment she may have suffered. All of these damage 
components, including any others discovered as this matter proceeds, need to be 
addressed. 
Based on the above, Delone Peeples gives notice of her claim for 
damages against the State of Utah. 
DATED this (c) day of September, 2002. 
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN 
Dustin Lance 
Attorney for Claimant 
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SUIT/CLAIM RECETVED 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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ADDENDUM B 
"Order Granting the State's Motion to Dismiss and 
Directing Entry of Final Judgement" dated May 27, 2003 
BARRY G. LAWRENCE - 5304 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF - 4666 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant, State of Utah 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Telephone: (801)366-0100 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 




THE STATE OF UTAH and MAGNA 
INVESTMENTS & DEVELOPMENT, a 
limited partnership, 
Defendants. 
1 ORDER GRANTING THE STATE'S 
| MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 030900399 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
Procedural Background: This case arises out of a slip and fall accident that occurred 
on December 5, 2001, in front of a Utah State Liquor Store (the "Accident"). Plaintiff filed a 
Notice of Claim on September 18, 2002, relating to the Accident, and on January 8, 2003, filed a 
Complaint alleging claims of negligence against Magna Investments and Development (the 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAY 2 7 :203 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
owner of the property) and the State of Utah (who leased the property for use as a State Liquor 
Store.) On January 22, 2003, the State responded with a Motion to Dismiss (along with a 
supporting memorandum) asserting that plaintiff failed to comply with the Notice of Claim 
provision (Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11) of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 63-30-1, et. seq. (the "Act")), by failing to provide the location of the Accident in her 
Notice. On February 14, 2003, plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the State's Motion. 
The State then filed a reply memorandum in support of its Motion on February 25, 2003. On 
May 12, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., a hearing took place on the State's Motion. Barry G. Lawrence, 
Assistant Attorney General, appeared on behalf of the State of Utah; Brock Van de Kamp of 
Siegfried & Jensen appeared for the plaintiff. Terry Plant of Plant, Wallace, Christensen & 
Kanell, was also present on behalf of Magna Investments & Development. 
Ruling on the Motion to Dismiss. The State of Utah argued that the plaintiffs claims 
against it were barred by the Act because plaintiffs Notice of Claim failed to identify the 
location of the Accident. Plaintiff argued, inter alia, that § 63-30-1 l(3)(a)(i) only required that a 
Notice of Claim contain a "brief statement of facts" and did not expressly require the location of 
the Accident. At the conclusion of the oral argument, and having considered the pleadings and 
submissions of the parties, and the argument of counsel, the Court granted the State's Motion to 
Dismiss. 
The Court specifically rules as follows: 
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For purposes of the State's Motion, this Court holds that the following facts, taken 
from plaintiffs Complaint and Notice of Claim, are not in dispute: 
1. This case arises out of a slip and fall accident that occurred on December 5, 2001, in 
front of a Utah State Liquor Store. 
2. Plaintiff filed a Notice of Claim on September 18, 2002, relating to the Accident. 
3. In that Notice of Claim, plaintiff provided the following statement concerning the 
Accident: 
On December 5, 2001, Ms. Peeples fell in front of a Utah State Liquor Store on 
ice, which was allowed to accumulate on the sidewalk, from a poorly designed 
rain gutter that drains onto the top of the sidewalk, rather than underneath it. 
The next paragraph in the Notice describes the State's alleged negligence; the following 
paragraph describes plaintiffs alleged damages. 
4. The Notice of Claim did not identify at which Utah State Liquor Store the Accident 
occurred. 
For purposes of the State's Motion to Dismiss, this Court makes the following 
conclusions of law: 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(a)(i) of the Act required claimant to have included a 
"brief statement of facts" relating to the Accident in her Notice of Claim. 
2. The Act does not explicitly identify which facts are to be included; accordingly, this 
Court must look to the purpose of the Act to determine what facts should be included in a Notice 
of Claim. 
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3. According to the Utah Supreme Court, the purposes of the Act are twofold: to provide 
the State with "an opportunity to correct the condition that caused the injury", and to "evaluate 
the claim, and perhaps settle the matter without expense of litigation." Pigs Gun Club v. Sanpete 
County, 42 P.3d 379, 382 (Utah 2002); Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201, 1204 (Utah 
1999). 
4. Accordingly, in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act, this Court concludes that 
the Notice of Claim, in a slip and fall case such as this, must identify the location of the accident. 
In this case, claimant should have provided the address of the liquor store at issue; her reference 
to an unidentified Utah State Liquor store did not provide the State with the location of the 
Accident. 
5. Therefore, the claimant failed to comply with the Notice of Claim provision of the 
Act, and so this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs claim against the State. 
Accordingly, the State of Utah should be dismissed from this case. 
6. The Court further concludes that although the State may have had actual notice of the 
location of the Accident from other correspondence sent by plaintiffs counsel, the court will 
not consider such extrinsic evidence because actual notice "does not cure a party's failure" to 
comply with the notice of claim provisions of the Act. Pigs Gun Club v. Sanpete County, 42 
P.3d 379, 382 (Utah 2002); Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999). 
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. Defendant State of Utah's Motion to Dismiss is granted. 
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2. Plaintiffs claims against the State asserted herein are hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. 
3. This Order resolves all claims pending between the plaintiff and the State of Utah. 
Further, because the issue involved on this motion (i.e., governmental immunity) is unique to the 
State, there is no just reason for delaying the conclusion of this matter. Accordingly, this Court 
directs that Final Judgment be entered in this matter in favor of the State of Utah pursuant to 
Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 54(b). 
DATED this a \ day of May, 2003. 
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I hereby certify that pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah R. Jud. Admin., I faxed a true and 
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